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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the proof complexity of a wide range
of substructural systems. For any proof system P at least as strong
as Full Lambek calculus, FL, and polynomially simulated by the ex-
tended Frege system for some infinite branching super-intuitionistic
logic, we present an exponential lower bound on the proof lengths.
More precisely, we will provide a sequence of P-provable formulas
tAnu
8
n“1 such that the length of the shortest P-proof for An is ex-
ponential in the length of An. The lower bound also extends to the
number of proof-lines (proof-lengths) in any Frege system (extended
Frege system) for a logic between FL and any infinite branching super-
intuitionistic logic. We will also prove a similar result for the proof sys-
tems and logics extending Visser’s basic propositional calculus BPC
and its logic BPC, respectively. Finally, in the classical substructural
setting, we will establish an exponential lower bound on the number of
proof-lines in any proof system polynomially simulated by the cut-free
version of CFLew.
1 Introduction
Propositional proof complexity, as a new independent field, was established
predominantly to address the fundamental unsolved problems in computa-
tional complexity. Starting steps in this systematic study were taken by Cook
∗Supported by the grant 19-05497S of GA CˇR and RVO: 67985840.
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and Reckhow. In their seminal paper [6], they defined a propositional proof
system, PPS, as a polynomial-time computable function whose range is the
set of all classical propositional tautologies. Then, they defined a polynomi-
ally bounded proof system as a PPS having a short proof for any tautology,
i.e., a proof whose length is polynomially bounded by the length of the tautol-
ogy itself. They proved that the existence of a polynomially-bounded proof
system for the classical logic is equivalent to NP “ coNP. Accordingly, if for
any PPS there are super-polynomial lower bounds on the lengths of proofs,
as a result NP will be different from coNP and consequently, P will be dif-
ferent from NP. Since these are considered to be major open problems in
computational complexity, providing super-polynomial lower bounds for all
PPS’s gained momentum in the field of proof complexity of classical proof
systems. Thus far, exponential lower bounds on proof lengths have been es-
tablished in many different propositional proof systems, including resolution
[10], cutting planes [19], and bounded-depth Frege systems [4]. For more on
the lengths of proofs, see [15].
Aside from the extensive study of some well-known classical proof sys-
tems, recently there have been some investigations into the complexity of
proofs in non-classical logics on account of their various applications, their
power in expressibility and their essential role in computer science. There-
fore, it is important to fully understand the inherent complexity of proofs
in non-classical logics, considering specially the impact that lower bounds
on lengths of proofs will have on the performance of the proof search algo-
rithms. Moreover, from the computational complexity perspective, the study
of complexity of proofs in non-classical logics is associated with another major
computational complexity problem, namely the NP vs. PSPACE problem.
Various results have been acheived in this area, for instance exponential lower
bounds for the intuitionistic and modal logics [12], and for modal and intu-
itionistic Frege and extended Frege systems [13]. A comprehensive overview
of results concerning proof complexity of non-classical logics can be found in
[5].
In the realm of non-classical logics, substructural ones are logics origi-
nally defined by the systems where some or all of the usual structural rules
are absent. These logics include relevant logics, linear logic, fuzzy logics, and
many-valued logics. However, the field is more ambitious than any limited in-
vestigation of possible effects of the structural rules. The purpose of the study
of substructural logics is to uniformly investigate the non-classical logics
that originated from different motivations. Complexity-theoretically, several
substructural logics are PSPACE-complete, for instance the multiplicative-
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additive fragment of linear logic, MALL [17], and full Lambek calculus, FL
[14]. Check also the PSPACE-hardness for a wide range of substructural log-
ics and PSPACE-completeness for a class of extensions of FL in [11]. Some
complexity results about the decision problem of some fragments of Visser’s
basic propositional logic, BPC, and formal propositional logic, FPL are also
studied in [21].
In this paper, we will study the proof complexity of proof systems for
substructural logics and basic logic, and hence a wide-range class of proof
systems. More precisely, we will start with an arbitrary proof system P at
least as strong as FL (or BPC) and polynomially simulated by an extended
Frege system for some super-intuitionistic infinite branching logic L, denoted
by L´ EF. For such a P, we will provide a sequence of hard P-tautologies,
namely a sequence of P-provable formulas tAnu8n“1 with length polynomial in
n such that their shortest P-proofs are exponentially long in n. Our method
is using a sequence of intuitionistic tautologies for which we know there exists
an exponential lower bound on the length of their proofs in any L´EF, where
L is infinite branching. Since these formulas are not necessarily provable in
P, the essential step is their modification so that they become provable in
FL (or BPC) and hence in P, while they remain hard for L´ EF. Finally,
since L ´ EF is shown to be polynomially as strong as P, the length of any
P-proofs of the P-tautologies must be exponential in n. Furthermore, using
the same FL-tautologies, one can infer an exponential lower bound also for
proof systems polynomially simulated by CFL´ew, where the superscript “´”
means the sequent calculus does not have the cut rule.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we provide some background and also some new notions needed
in the future sections. Throughout the paper we mainly work with substruc-
tural logics and we follow [8] as the canonical source for the study of the
theory of such logics. Nevertheless, to make the paper as self-contained as
possible, we include all necessary background information.
2.1 Substructural logics
Consider the propositional language t^,_, ˚,J,K, 1, 0, {, z,Ñu. The logical
connective ˚ is called fusion and the connectives { and z are called left and
right residuals, respectively. Throughout the paper, small Roman letters,
p, q, . . ., are reserved for propositional variables, Greek small letters φ, ψ,
. . ., and Roman capital letters A, B, . . ., are meta-variables for formulas and
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Greek capital letters Γ, Σ, . . ., are meta-variables for (possibly empty) finite
sequences of formulas, separated by commas (unless specified otherwise).
Consider the following set of rules over sequents of the form Γñ ∆. The
meta-variable Γ is called the antecedent of the sequent and ∆ its succedent.
All the rules are presented in the form of schemes. Therefore, an instance of
a rule is obtained by substituting formulas for lower case letters and finite
(possibly empty) sequences of formulas for upper case letters.
Initial sequents:
φñ φ Γñ ∆,J,Λ Γ,K,Σñ ∆ ñ 1 0ñ
Structural rules:
Weakening rules:
Γ,Σñ ∆ pLwq
Γ, φ,Σñ ∆
Γñ ∆,Λ pRwq
Γñ ∆, φ,Λ
Contraction rules:
Γ, φ, φ,Σñ ∆ pLcq
Γ, φ,Σñ ∆
Γñ ∆, φ, φ,Λ pRcq
Γñ ∆, φ,Λ
Exchange rules:
Γ, φ, ψ,Σñ ∆ pLeq
Γ, ψ, φ,Σñ ∆
Γñ ∆, φ, ψ,Λ pReq
Γñ ∆, ψ, φ,Λ
The cut rule:
Γñ φ,Λ Σ, φ,Πñ ∆ pcutq
Σ,Γ,Πñ ∆,Λ
The logical rules:
Γ,Σñ ∆ p1wq
Γ, 1,Σñ ∆
Γñ ∆,Λ p0wq
Γñ ∆, 0,Λ
Γ, φ,Σñ ∆ pL^1qΓ, φ^ ψ,Σñ ∆
Γ, ψ,Σñ ∆ pL^2qΓ, φ^ ψ,Σñ ∆
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Γñ ∆, φ,Λ Γñ ∆, ψ,Λ pR^q
Γñ ∆, φ^ ψ,Λ
Γ, φ,Σñ ∆ Γ, ψ,Σñ ∆ pL_q
Γ, φ_ ψ,Σñ ∆
Γñ ∆, φ,Λ pR_1qΓñ ∆, φ_ ψ,Λ
Γñ ∆, ψ,Λ pR_2qΓñ ∆, φ_ ψ,Λ
Γ, φ, ψ,Σñ ∆ pL˚q
Γ, φ ˚ ψ,Σñ ∆
Γñ ∆, φ,Λ Σñ ∆, ψ,Λ pR˚q
Γ,Σñ ∆, φ ˚ ψ,Λ
The non-commutative implications rules:
Γñ φ Π, ψ,Σñ ∆ pL{q
Π, ψ{φ,Γ,Σñ ∆
Γ, φñ ψ pR{q
Γñ ψ{φ
Γñ φ Π, ψ,Σñ ∆ pLzq
Π,Γ, φzψ,Σñ ∆
φ,Γñ ψ pRzq
Γñ φzψ
The commutative implication rules:
Γñ φ,Λ Π, ψ,Σñ ∆ pLÑq
Π, φÑ ψ,Γ,Σñ ∆,Λ
Γ, φñ ψ,∆ pRÑq
Γñ φÑ ψ,∆
Using these rules, we define two families of sequent-style systems in the
following. By a single-conclusion sequent we mean the succedent of the se-
quent is empty or there is at most one formula. Otherwise, we call it multi-
conclusion. Let peq, pcq, piq, poq, and pwq “ pi ` oq stand for exchange,
contraction, left-weakening, right-weakening and weakening, respectively:
Single-conclusion. By a single-conclusion version of any of the above-
mentioned rules, we mean one of its instances where both the premisses and
the conclusion sequents are single-conclusion. Notice that the rules pRcq
and pReq do not have a single-conclusion instance. The meta-variables ∆
and Λ are schematic variables to be replaced by the empty set or a single
formula so that all the sequents remain single-conclusion. For instance, in
the rule pRwq both ∆ and Λ must be empty. We will use the convention that
˚ more strongly than z and {. The interpretation of any single-conclusion
sequent Γ ñ φ is defined as IpΓ ñ φq “ ˚Γzφ and for the sequent pΓ ñq
as IpΓ ñq “ ˚Γz0, where by ˚Γ for Γ “ γ1, . . . , γn we mean γ1 ˚ . . . ˚ γn,
and for Γ “ H, we have ˚Γ “ 1.
Set L˚ “ t^,_, ˚, z, {, 1, 0u. For any S Ď te, i, o, cu, define FLS over the
language L˚ as the system consisting of the single-conclusion version of the
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previous rules except for: the commutative implication rules, the structural
rules out of the set S, and the initial sequents for K and J. Define FLK
over the language L˚ Y tKu as FL with the initial sequent for K. Figure
2.1, which is adapted from [8], shows the relationship between these sequent
calculi. Moreover, define the system weak Lambek, denoted by WL, over
the language t1,K,^,_, ˚, zu similar to FLK, excluding the following rules:
pL{q, pR{q, and pLzq. Some other useful calculi are introduced in Table 1.
For a sequent calculus S and a set of sequents Γ by the notation S ` Γ we
mean the sequent calculus obtained from adding the elements of Γ as initial
sequents to S. By the notation φ ô ψ we mean both φ ñ ψ and ψ ñ φ.
The formula φn is defined inductively. φ1 is φ and by φn`1, we mean φ ˚ φn.
Table 1: Some sequent calculi with their definitions.
Logic Definition
RL FL ` p0ô 1q
CyFL FL ` pφz0ô 0{φq
DFL FL ` pφ^ pψ _ θq ñ pφ^ ψq _ pφ^ θqq
PnFL FL ` pφn ô φn`1q
psBL FLw ` tpφ^ ψ ô φ ˚ pφzψqq, pφ^ ψ ô pψ{φq ˚ φqu
DRL RL` pφ^ pψ _ θq ñ pφ^ ψq _ pφ^ θqq
IRL RL` pφñ 1q
CRL RL` pφ ˚ ψ ô ψ ˚ φq
GBH RL` tpφ^ ψ ô φ ˚ pφzψqq, pφ^ ψ ô pψ{φq ˚ φqu
Br RL` pφ^ ψ ô φ ˚ ψq
Multi-conclusion. In the absence of the exchange rules, there are many
possible ways to define the multi-conclusion rules for fusion and implications
and the systems are in some respects more difficult than the commutative
case. In this paper, we only consider the commutative case and hence we
will use the language t^,_, ˚,Ñ, 0, 1u, assuming only one implication. The
interpretation of any sequent Γ ñ ∆ is defined as IpΓ ñ ∆q “ ˚Γ Ñ
 p˚ ∆q, where  φ is an abbreviation for φÑ 0.
Let S Ď te, i, o, cu such that e P S. By CFLS, we mean the system consisting
of the multi-conclusion version of the previous rules except for: the structural
rules out of the set S, the non-commutative implication rules, and the initial
sequent for K. By CFLS´, we mean CFLS without the cut rule.
For a sequent calculus S, proofs and provability of formulas are defined in
the usual way, and by its logic, S, we mean the set of provable formulas in
it, i.e., all formulas φ such that pñ φq is provable in S.
Remark 2.1. Note that if e P S, it is easy to show that in the system
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FL
FLcFLeFLoFLi
FLw FLei FLeo FLco FLec
FLew FLci “ FLeci FLeco
FLcw “ FLecw “ LJ
Figure 1: Basic substructural calculi
FLS the two connectives ψ{φ and φzψ are provably equivalent and we can
denote them by the usual connective φ Ñ ψ. Moreover, it is also possible
to axiomatize the system FLS over the language L
˚´ t{, zu Y tÑu, using all
the rules in FLS, replacing the non-commutative implication rules with the
commutative ones. Similarly, in the sequent calculus FLecw, the formulas
φ ˚ ψ and φ ^ ψ become equivalent and 0 and 1 will be equivalent to K
and J, respectively. Hence, it is possible to axiomatize FLecw over the
language L “ t^,_,Ñ,J,Ku, using all the initial sequents and rules for
the corresponding connectives. This is nothing but the usual system LJ,
for the intuitionistic logic, IPC. A similar type of argument also applies
on CFLS when e P S and for CFLecw “ LK, where LK is the sequent
calculus for the classical logic, CPC. Finally, it is worth mentioning that
the logic CFLe is essentially equivalent to the multiplicative additive linear
logic, MALL, introduced by Girard [9] and the logic FLe is known as its
intuitionistic version, called IMALL. CFLew is sometimes called the monoidal
logic and CFLec is essentially equivalent to the relevant logic R without the
distributive law. For more details, see [8].
The sequent calculi FLS and CFLS enjoy cut elimination. This fact has
been shown independently by several authors. For instance, see [9], [16], and
[18].
Definition 2.2. We say a formula φ is provable from a set of formulas Γ in
the logic FL and we write it as Γ $FL φ when the sequent ñ φ is provable in
the sequent calculus FL by adding all ñ γ for γ P Γ as initial sequents, i.e.,
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tñ γuγPΓ $FLñ φ. When Γ is the empty set we sometimes write FL $ φ for
$FL φ.
We will use a similar convention that for S a logic or a proof system or a
sequent calculus, $S φ and S $ φ are used interchangeably.
If the sequent φ1, . . . , φn ñ ψ is provable in the sequent calculus FL, then
we have tφ1, . . . , φnu $FL ψ. However, the converse, which is the deduction
theorem, does not hold. In fact, unlike the classical and intuitionistic log-
ics, most other substructural logics, including FL, do not have a deduction
theorem. We will see in Theorem 2.5 that only a restricted version of the
deduction theorem (called parametrized local deduction theorem) holds for
$FL. However, note that by definition for a formula φ we have $FL φ if and
only if ñ φ is provable in the sequent calculus FL.
So far, we have defined some basic substructural logics with their sequent
calculi. Now, it is a good point to introduce a substructural logic in a general
sense. From now on, when no confusion occurs, we will write the fusion φ ˚ψ
as φψ.
Definition 2.3. Let L be a set of L˚-formulas. L is a substructural logic (over
FL) if it is closed under substitution and satisfies the following conditions:
piq L includes all formulas in FL,
piiq if φ, ψ P L, then φ^ ψ P L,
piiiq if φ, φzψ P L, then φ P L,
pivq if φ P L and ψ is an arbitrary formula, then ψzφψ, ψφ{ψ P L.
For a set of formulas Γ Y tφu, define Γ $L φ as Γ Y L $FL φ. We have $L φ
is equivalent to φ P L.
When L is the logic FL, then $FL defined above will be the same as the
one defined in Definition 2.2. Therefore, there will be no ambiguity. As a
corollary of Theorem [8, 2.16], it is shown that the above definition can be
replaced by the following: a substructural logic over FL is a set of formulas
closed under both substitution and $FL.
It is easy to see that for any subset S of te, i, o, cu, the logic FLS is a sub-
structural logic. We can see that if $FLS Γñ φ, then Γ $FLS φ. This can be
easily shown since we can simulate each rule in te, i, o, cu by the correspond-
ing axiom below and using the cut rule:
peq : pφ ˚ ψqzpψ ˚ φq , pcq : φzpφ ˚ φq , piq : φz1 , poq : 0zφ
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Moreover, note that for all the sequent calculi in Table 1, the sequent calculus
FL is present and hence all their corresponding logics are closed under the
conditions in Definition 2.3. Therefore, they are substructural logics.
Definition 2.4. Let φ and α be formulas. Define
λαpφq “ pαzpφαqq ^ 1 and ραpφq “ ppαφq{αq ^ 1.
We call λαpφq and ραpφq the left and right conjugate of φ with respect to α,
respectively. An iterated conjugate of φ is a composition γα1pγα2p. . . γαnpφqqq,
for formulas α1, . . . , αn where n ě 0 and γαi P tλαi , ραiu.
It can be easily shown ([8, Lemma 2.13.]) that if a sequent Γ, α, β,Σñ φ
is provable in FL, then the following sequents are also provable in FL:
Γ, β, λβpαq,Σñ φ and Γ, ραpβq, α,Σñ φ.
The following theorem states the parametrized local deduction theorem for
FL.
Theorem 2.5. [8, Theorem 2.14.] Let L be a substructural logic and Φ Y
ΨY tφu be a set of formulas. Then,
Φ,Ψ $L φ iff Φ $L p
n
˚
i“1
γipψiqqzφ
for some n, where each γipψiq is an iterated conjugate of a formula ψi P Ψ.
Remark 2.6. Note that the definition of $L in Definition 2.3 depends on the
sequent calculus FL and not the mere logic FL. The reason is that $FL, which
is defined in Definition 2.2, uses the sequent calculus FL. It is possible to use
Theorem 2.5 to provide the following proof system-independent definition of
$L:
Γ $L φ iff p
n
˚
i“1
γipAiqqzφ P L iff p
m
˚
i“1
γipBiqqzφ P FL
for some n and m and some Ai P Γ and Bi P ΓY tLu.
2.2 Super-basic logics
In [22], Visser introduced basic propositional logic, BPC, and formal propo-
sitional logic, FPL, to interpret implication as formal provability. In [20],
Ruitenberg reintroduced BPC via philosophical reasons and produced its
predicate version, BQC. In the following, we present the sequent calculus
introduced in [2] for the logic BPC, denoted by BPC. It was shown that this
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proof system is complete with respect to transitive persistent Kripke models.
Since formulas pA Ñ pA Ñ Bqq Ñ pA Ñ Bq and pA Ñ pB Ñ Cqq Ñ pB Ñ
pAÑ Cqq are not always true in transitive models (the former formula corre-
sponds to the contraction rule and the latter to the exchange rule), one may
view BPC as a substructural logic. In this logic modus ponens is weakened
and hence BPC is weaker than the intuitionistic logic. BPC is also connected
with the modal logic K4 via Go¨del’s translation T , as shown in [22].
The language of BPC is L “ t^,_,J,K,Ñu and negation is defined as
the abbreviation for  φ “ φ Ñ K. In this subsection capital Greek letters
denote (possibly empty) multisets of L-formulas. By Γ, φ or φ,Γ, we mean
the multiset ΓYtφu. Sequents ofBPC are of the same form of the sequents of
LK and they are interpreted in the same way, i.e., IpΓÑ ∆q “ŹΓÑŽ∆.
The initial sequent and rules of BPC are as follows:
Γ, φñ φ,∆ Γñ J,∆ Γ,K ñ ∆
φ, ψ,Γñ ∆ pL^q
φ^ ψ,Γñ ∆
Γñ ∆, φ Γñ ∆, ψ pR^q
Γñ ∆, φ^ ψ
φ,Γñ ∆ ψ,Γñ ∆ pL_q
φ_ ψ,Γñ ∆
Γñ ∆, φ, ψ pR_q
Γñ ∆, φ_ ψ
φ,Γñ ψ pRÑq
Γñ ∆, φÑ ψ
φ^ ψ,Γñ ∆ φ^ θ,Γñ ∆ pDq
φ^ pψ _ θq,Γñ ∆
Γñ φÑ ψ Γñ ψ Ñ θ pTrq
Γñ ∆, φÑ θ
Γñ φÑ ψ Γñ φÑ θ pF^q
Γñ ∆, φÑ pψ ^ θq
Γñ φÑ θ Γñ ψ Ñ θ pF_q
Γñ ∆, pφ_ ψq Ñ θ
Γñ φ,∆ Σ, φñ Λ pcutq
Γ,Σñ ∆,Λ
Note that since we are assuming multisets of formulas, in this proof system
the exchange rules are built in. Moreover, the left and right weakening and
contraction rules are admissible in this proof system and it enjoys the cut
elimination (see [2] Lemma 2.2, Lemma 2.12, Lemma 2.14, and Theorem
2.17, respectively).
An extension of BPC augmented by the axiom J Ñ K ñ K is given in
[3], denoted by EBPC. It is shown that this proof system is complete with
respect to transitive persistent Kripke models that are serial [3]. Logic of
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the sequent calculus BPC is defined as the set of all formulas φ such that
BPC $ pñ φq, and is denoted by BPC. In a similar way, we can define the
logic of the sequent calculus EBPC which we denote by EBPC. It is shown
that BPC Ř EBPC Ř IPC [3].
Definition 2.7. We say a formula φ is provable from a set of formulas Γ in
the logic BPC and we write it as Γ $BPC φ when the sequent ñ φ is provable
in the sequent calculus BPC by adding all ñ γ for γ P Γ as initial sequents.
Remark 2.8. Note that although the modus ponens rule is neither present
nor admissible in the sequent calculus BPC, its logic BPC admits the modus
ponens rule. I.e., if φ P BPC and φ Ñ ψ P BPC, then ψ P BPC. The reason
is that if φ Ñ ψ P BPC then BPC $ pñ φ Ñ ψq. By cut elimination, there
exists a cut-free proof of pñ φ Ñ ψq in BPC. Then by induction on the
structure of this cut-free proof we can show that BPC $ φ ñ ψ. Finally,
since φ P BPC, we have BPC $ pñ φq, and then using the cut rule we get
BPC $ pñ ψq which means ψ P BPC. The same property also holds for the
logic EBPC. The proof is an easy consequence of the completeness of EBPC
with respect to serial transitive persistent Kripke models.
Definition 2.9. Let L be a set of L-formulas. L is a super-basic logic (over
BPC) if it is closed under substitution and satisfies the following conditions:
piq L includes all formulas in BPC,
piiq if φ, φÑ ψ P L, then φ P L.
For a set of formulas ΓY tφu, define Γ $L φ as ΓY L $BPC φ.
Note that $L φ is equivalent to φ P L. One direction is obvious; if φ P L
then $L φ. For the other direction, we will prove a stronger result that if
Γ $L φ then
Ź
Γ Ñ φ P L. This can be proved using induction on the
structure of the proof. For this matter, we transform every rule of BPC into
a BPC-provable formula. To complete the proof of the other direction, sinceŹ
Γ “ J for Γ “ H, we have J Ñ φ P L, which by modus ponens implies
φ P L.
As an example, using Remark 2.8, both BPC and EBPC are super-basic
logics. Moreover, super-intuitionistic logics (changing the first condition by
including all formulas in IPC) are also super-basic, since BPC Ă IPC and they
are closed under modus ponens.
For a logic L and a set of formulas Γ, by L ` Γ we mean the smallest
logic containing L and all the substitutions of formulas in Γ. We can define
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Jankov’s logic, KC, as follows: it is the smallest logic containing IPC and the
weak excluded middle formula, i.e., KC “ IPC `  p _   p. The condition
on the Kripke models for this logic is being directed. The axioms BDn are
defined in the following way:
BD0 :“ K , BDn`1 :“ pn _ ppn Ñ BDnq.
The logic of bounded depth BDn is then defined as IPC`BDn. Define logic
Tk as
IPC`
kľ
i“0
pppi Ñ
ł
j‰i
pjq Ñ
ł
j
pjq Ñ
ł
i
pi.
A super-intuitionistic logic L has branching k if Tk Ď L. We say a super-
intuitionistic logic L has finite branching if there exists a number k such that
L has branching less than or equal to k, otherwise we call it infinite branching.
We will not use the following theorem by Jerˇa´bek in our future discussions.
However, it is worth mentioning since it presents a nice characterization of
super-intuitionistic infinite branching logics.
Theorem 2.10. [13, Theorem 6.9] Let L be a super-intuitionistic logic.
Then, L has infinite branching if and only if L Ď BD2 or L Ď KC` BD3.
3 Frege and extended Frege systems
The purpose of this section is to introduce Frege and extended Frege systems
for substructural and super-basic logics. For that matter, we will recall or
generalize some basic concepts in proof complexity. For more background
the reader may consult [15].
Definition 3.1. Let L be a set of finite strings over a finite alphabet. A
(propositional) proof system for L is a polynomial-time function P with the
range L. Any string pi such that Pppiq “ φ is a P-proof of the string φ,
sometimes written as P $pi φ. We denote proof systems by bold-face capital
Roman letters.
By length of a formula φ, or a proof pi, we mean the number of symbols
it contains and we denote it by |φ| and |pi|, respectively. We usually consider
proof systems for a logic L. The usual Hilbert-style systems with finitely
many axiom schemes and Gentzen’s sequent calculi are instances of proposi-
tional proof systems, because they are complete and in polynomial time one
can decide whether a finite string is a proof in the system or not.
Definition 3.2. Let P and Q be two proof systems with the languages LP
and LQ, respectively. Let tr be a polynomial-time translation function from
the strings in the language LP to the strings in the language LQ. We will
denote it by tr : LP Ñ LQ.
We say that the proof system Q simulates the proof system P (or P is
simulated by Q, or Q is at least as strong as P) with respect to tr, if there
is a function f such that Qpfppiqq “ trpPppiqq and we denote it by P ďtr Q.
We say that the proof system Q polynomially simulates (p-simulates) the
proof system P (or P is polynomially simulated by Q) with respect to tr,
if the function f is also polynomially bounded in length, i.e., there exists
a polynomial qpnq such that |fppiq| ď qp|pi|q. We denote this reduction by
P ďtrp Q.
In the simpler case that LP Ď LQ and the translation function is the inclusion
function, we say Q simulates (p-simulates) P and denote it by P ď Q (P ďp
Q). If LP “ LQ and the translation function is the identity function, we
say that the proof system P and Q are polynomially equivalent when they
p-simulate each other.
Finally, in a similar manner, for two logics L andM and a translation function
tr : LL Ñ LM, by L Ďtr M, we mean that for any φ P LL, if φ P L then
trpφq P M.
Note that if we take L “ CPC to be the range of both proof systems P
and Q, and let the translation function tr to be the identity function, we
reach Cook and Reckhow’s original definition of p-simulation in [6].
In the following we present a translation function t that enables us to carry
out results in systems with the language L to systems with the language L˚.
This translation function is nothing but bringing back the structural rules:
Definition 3.3. Define the function t : L˚ Ñ L as follows:
‚ pt “ p, where p is a propositional variable;
‚ 0t “ K, 1t “ J;
‚ pφ ˝ ψqt “ φt ˝ ψt, where ˝ P t^,_u;
‚ pφ ˚ ψqt “ φt ^ ψt;
‚ pψ{φqt “ pφzψqt “ φt Ñ ψt.
For Γ, a finite sequence of formulas γ1, γ2, . . . , γn, by Γ
t we mean the sequence
of formulas γt
1
, γt
2
. . . , γtn. It is easy to see that |φt| “ |φ|.
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The following lemma, which will be used in the future sections, is an
example of how the translation t works. It expresses the relation between
sequents provable in the sequent calculus WL and the translated version of
the sequents in the system BPC.
Lemma 3.4. Let Γ be a sequence of formulas and A be a formula. Then
WL $ Γñ A implies BPC $ Γt ñ At.
Proof. It can be shown by an easy induction on the structure of the proof.
Note that as mentioned earlier, the left contraction rule and both right and
left weakening rules are derivable in BPC and exchange rules are built in.
As an example, suppose the last rule in the proof of Γñ A is pR˚q:
Σñ φ Πñ ψ
Σ,Πñ φ ˚ ψ
By induction hypothesis we have BPC $ Σt ñ φt and BPC $ Πt ñ
ψt. Since the left weakening rule is admissible in BPC, we can have both
BPC $ Σt,Πt ñ φt and BPC $ Σt,Πt ñ ψt. Using the rule pR^q we
obtain BPC $ Σt,Πt ñ φt ^ ψt, which is what we wanted.
Remark 3.5. For any substructural logic L and any super-intuitionistic logic
M, it is easy to see that L Ďt M implies the stronger form:
φ1, . . . , φn $L φ implies φt1, . . . , φtn $M φt.
The reason lies in the definition of $L and $M. The proof is similar to the
proof of Lemma 3.4.
In the following we will define Frege and extended Frege systems for
substructural and super-basic logics.
Definition 3.6. An inference system P is defined by a set of rules of the
form
φ1 . . . φm
φ
where φi and φ are formulas. A P-proof , pi, of a formula φ from a set of
formulas X is defined as a sequence of formulas φ1, . . . , φn “ φ, where φi P X
or φi is obtained by substituting some φj ’s, j ă i, in a rule of the system
P. Each φi is called a step or a line in the proof pi. The number of lines of
a proof pi is denoted by λppiq and it is clear that it is less than or equal to
the length of the proof (the number of symbols in the proof). The set of all
provable formulas in P is called its logic. If there is a P-proof for φ from
assumptions φ1, . . . , φn, we write φ1, . . . , φn $P φ. Specially, for every rule
of the above form we have φ1, . . . , φm $P φ. Finally, the number of lines of
the proof pi is defined as the number of formulas in the proof pi.
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Definition 3.7. In a sequent calculus a line in a proof is a sequent of the
form Γñ ∆. We denote the number of proof-lines in a proof pi in a sequent
calculus by λppiq, as in an inference systems. It is obvious that the number
of proof-lines of a sequent is less than or equal to the length of the proof.
There are two measures for the complexity of proofs in proof systems. The
first one is the length of the proof and the other is the number of proof steps
(also called proof-lines). This only makes sense for proof systems in which the
proofs consist of lines containing formulas or sequents. Hilbert-style proof
systems, Gentzen’s sequent calculi, and Frege systems are examples of such
proof systems.
Definition 3.8. Let L be a substructural logic or a super-basic logic. P is
called a Frege system for L, if it satisfies the following conditions:
p1q P is an inference system,
p2q P has finitely many rules,
p3q P is sound: if $P φ, then φ P L,
p4q P is strongly complete: if φ1, . . . , φn $L φ, then φ1, . . . , φn $P φ.
Moreover, a Frege system P is called standard if
p31q P is strongly sound: if φ1, . . . , φn $P φ, then φ1, . . . , φn $L φ.
We will use the convention that all Frege systems are standard. Note that
for the substructural logic L, the relation $L has the property mentioned in
Theorem 2.5.
Hilbert-style proof systems for basic substructural logics and for BPC are
examples of Frege systems. See Hilbert-style systems HFLS for S a subset
of te, i, o, cu in [8, Section 2.5], and a Hilber-style system for BPC due to
Dosˇen in [7]. The usual Hilbert-style systems for classical and intuitionistic
logics, HK and HJ respectively, are also examples of Frege systems; see [8,
Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.3] for the definitions of these systems. It is easy to see
that these systems satisfy the conditions of a standard Frege system.
Remark 3.9. Note that, by an easy induction, it can be shown that for a
system P to satisfy the condition p31q in Definition 3.8, it is enough to show
that each rule of P is standard, i.e., for any rule of P of the form
φ1 . . . φm
φ
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we have φ1, . . . , φn $L φ. In our discussions in the future sections, we use
this condition.
Definition 3.10. An extended Frege system for a substructural logic (or a
super-basic logic) L, denoted by L´EF, is a Frege system for L together with
the extension axiom which allows formulas of the form p ” φ :“ ppzφ^ φzpq
(or p ” φ :“ ppÑ φ^φÑ pq) to be added to a derivation with the following
conditions: p is a new variable not occurring in φ, in any lines before p ” φ,
or in any hypotheses to the derivation. It can however appear in later lines,
but not in the last line.
It is easy to check that the definition of equivalence introduced in Defi-
nition 3.10 is closed under substitution, i.e., if A ” B then for any formula
φpp, q¯q we have φpA, q¯q ” φpB, q¯q.
Lemma 3.11. For any two Frege system P and Q for a logic L,there exists
a number c such that for any formula φ and any proof pi, there exists a proof
pi1 such that
P $pi φ implies Q $pi1 φ
and λppi1q ď cλppiq. In the case that P and Q are extended Frege systems,
they are polynomially equivalent.
Proof. The proof is easy and originally shown in [6]. The reason is that
any instance of a rule in P can be replaced by its proof in Q, which has a
fixed number of lines. Take c as the largest number of proof-lines of these
proofs. Since there are finite many rules in P, finding c is possible. Therefore,
λppi1q ď cλppiq. A similar argument also works for the length of the proofs.
As a result of Lemma 3.11, since we are concerned with the number of
proof-lines and lengths of proofs, we can talk about “the” Frege (extended
Frege) system for L and denote it by L´ F (L´ EF).
Definition 3.12. A proof in a Frege (extended Frege, Hilbert-style, Gentzen-
style) system is called tree-like if every step of the proof is used at most once
as a hypothesis of a rule in the proof. It is called a general (or dag-like)
proof, otherwise.
In this paper we will not use this distinction, because throughout the
paper all the proofs are considered to be dag-like, which is the more general
notion.
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4 A descent into the substructural world
In this section, we will present a sequence of tautologies and then we show
they are exponentially hard for any system L´EF for any substructural and
super-basic logics. In order to do so, we first provide some sentences provable
in the weak system WL. This uniformly provides two sequence of formulas
provable in FLK and BPC. In the case of FLK, since the system FLK is
conservative over FL and the formulas we are interested in do not contain
K, we will automatically have a proof in FL.
To provide tautologies in WL, we pursue the following strategy: First,
using the representations tK, 1u for true and false, we encode every binary
evaluation of an LK-formula by a suitable WL-proof. Then, using this
encoding, we map a certain fragment of LK into the system WL, without
any essential change into the original sequent. Finally, applying this map
on a certain hard intuitionistic tautology provides the intended hard WL-
tautology that we are looking for.
Definition 4.1. Let v be a Boolean valuation assigning truth values tt, fu
to the propositional variables. For a formula A in the language L, by vpAq
we mean the Boolean valuation of A by v, defined in the usual way. The
substitution σv for a formula A is defined in the following way: if an atom
is assigned “t” in the valuation v, substitute 1 for this atom in A and if an
atom is assigned “f” in v then substitute K for this atom in A. We write
Aσv for the formula obtained from this substitution.
Lemma 4.2. For any formula A constructed from atoms and t^,_u and for
any valuation v we have
if vpAq “ t, thenWL $ Aσv ô 1,
if vpAq “ f, thenWL $ Aσv ô K.
Proof. The proof is simple and uses induction on the structure of the formula
A. If it is an atom, then the claim is clear by the definition of Aσv . If
A “ B ^ C then if vpAq “ t we have V pBq “ vpCq “ t. Therefore, by
induction hypothesis we have
WL $ Bσv ô 1 and WL $ Cσv ô 1
Using the following proof-trees in WL
1ñ Bσv 1ñ Cσv
R^
1ñ Bσv ^ Cσv
Bσv ñ 1 L^1Bσv ^ Cσv ñ 1
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we obtain WL $ Bσv ^ Cσv ô 1, which is WL $ Aσv ô 1.
If A “ B ^ C and vpAq “ f , then one of the following happens
vpBq “ t, vpCq “ f or vpBq “ f, vpCq “ t or vpBq “ vpCq “ f
We investigate the first case, the other cases are similar. If vpBq “ t and
vpCq “ f , by induction hypothesis we get
WL $ Bσv ô 1 and WL $ Cσv ô K
Therefore, the following are provable in WL
Cσv ñ K pL^2q
Bσv ^ Cσv ñ K K ñ B
σv ^ Cσv
where the right sequent is an instance of the axiom for K. Hence, we get
WL $ Aσv ô K.
Finally, if A “ B_C, based on whether vpAq “ t or vpAq “ f we proceed as
before. All the cases are simple, therefore here we only investigate the case
where vpAq “ vpB _ Cq “ t and vpBq “ f and vpCq “ t, as an example.
Using the induction hypothesis for B and C, consider the following proof-
trees in WL:
1ñ Cσv pR_2q1ñ Bσv _ Cσv
Bσv ñ K K ñ 1 pcutq
Bσv ñ 1 Cσv ñ 1 pL_q
Bσv _ Cσv ñ 1
The following theorem is our main tool in proving the lower bound and
it provides a method to convert classical tautologies to tautologies in WL.
Theorem 4.3. If
Ź
ijPI
pij Ñ App¯q is a classical tautology, then we have
WL $ k˚
j“1
ppij ^ 1q ñ App¯q
where App¯q is a formula only consisting of p¯ “ p1, . . . , pn and connectives
t^,_u and I “ ti1, . . . , iku Ď t1, . . . , nu.
Proof. The theorem states that due to the commutativity of conjunction in
classical logic, any order on the elements of I, i.e. the sequence i1, . . . , ik, can
be used and ˚kj“1ppij ^ 1q ñ App¯q is provable in WL. However, the order
must be fixed throughout the proof.
Since
Ź
ijPI
pij Ñ App¯q is a classical tautology, it will be true under any
assignment of truth values to the propositional variables, especially the val-
uation v assigning truth to every pi, for i P I, and falsity to the rest. It is
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easy to see that under this valuation we have vpŹijPI pij q “ t and since we
also have vpŹijPI pij Ñ App¯qq “ t (because the formula is a classical tautol-
ogy), we get as a result vpAq “ t. Therefore, using Lemma 4.2 we obtain
WL $ Aσv ô 1 and since WL $ñ 1, using the cut rule we get
WL $ñ Aσv p‹q
On the other hand if we show
WL $ k˚
j“1
ppij ^ 1q, Aσv ñ A p:q
then using the cut rule on the sequents in p‹q and p:q we get
WL $ k˚
j“1
ppij ^ 1q ñ A.
We will prove p:q by induction on the structure of the formula A. If
A is equal to pij , for some j where ij P I, then since vppijq “ t, we have
Aσv “ pσvij “ 1. Therefore, the following proof-tree represents a proof in
WL:
pij ñ pij pL^1qpij ^ 1ñ pij p1wq
pij ^ 1, 1ñ pij p1wq
1, pij ^ 1, 1ñ pij pL^2qpij´1 ^ 1, pij ^ 1, 1ñ pij
...
pi1 ^ 1, . . . , pij´1 ^ 1, pij ^ 1, . . . , pik ^ 1, 1ñ pij pL˚q
pi1 ^ 1 ˚ pi2 ^ 1, . . . , pij´1 ^ 1, pij ^ 1, . . . , pik ^ 1, 1ñ pij
... pL˚q
˚kj“1ppij ^ 1q, 1ñ pij
where the first vertical dots means using the rules p1wq and pL^2q consecu-
tively. Note that based on the rule p1wq, we can add 1 in any position on the
left hand-side of the sequents. Using this fact together with the rule pL^2q
we obtain all formulas in the appropriate order. The second vertical dots
represents applications of the rule pL˚q consecutively until one reaches the
conclusion. Therefore, we have proved
WL $ k˚
j“1
ppij ^ 1q, Aσv ñ A.
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The case where A “ pij where ij R I is easier. Since for such j we have
vppij q “ f , using Lemma 4.2 we get WL $ Aσv ô K. Using the initial
sequent for K we have WL $ ˚kj“1ppij ^ 1q,K ñ A and using the cut rule
we get p:q.
If App¯q “ Bpp¯q ^ Cpp¯q, and the induction hypothesis holds for Bpp¯q and
Cpp¯q, i.e.,
WL $ k˚
j“1
ppij ^ 1q, Bσv ñ B , WL $
k
˚
j“1
ppij ^ 1q, Cσv ñ C p;q
then first using the rule pL^1q for the left sequent and rule pL^2q for the
right sequent, and then using the rule pR^q we get
WL $ k˚
j“1
ppij ^ 1q, Bσv ^ Cσv ñ B ^ C.
If App¯q “ Bpp¯q _ Cpp¯q then first using the rule pR_1q for the left sequent in
p;q and rule pR_2q for the right sequent in p;q, and then using pL_q we get
WL $ k˚
j“1
ppij ^ 1q, Bσv _ Cσv ñ B _ C.
4.1 A brief digression into hard tautologies
The formulas we are going to introduce as our hard tautologies for the system
FL´EF and BPC´EF are inspired by the hard formulas for IPC´F intro-
duced by Hrubesˇ [12] and their negation-free version introduced by Jerˇa´bek
[13]. In this subsection, we briefly explain these formulas and what combi-
natorial facts they represent.
Let us first define formulas Cliquen,k and Colorn,m which will be used in
Hrubesˇ’s formulas.
Definition 4.4. [15, Section 13.5] Let n, k,m ě 1. By an undirected simple
graph on rns we mean the set of strings of length `n
2
˘
. We say a graph has a
clique when there exists a complete subgraph, which is a subgraph with all
possible edges among its vertices. Define Cliquen,k to be the set of undirected
simple graphs on rns that have a clique of size at least k, and define Colorn,m
to be the set of garphs on rns that are m-colorable, and they are defined by
the following two sets.
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The set of clauses denoted by Cliqueknpp¯, q¯q uses
`
n
2
˘
atoms pij , ti, ju P
`
n
2
˘
,
one for each potential edge in a graph on rns, and k.n atoms qui intended to
describe a mapping from rks to rns. It consists of the following clauses:
‚ ŽiPrns qui, all u ď k,
‚  qui _ quj, all u P rks and i ‰ j P rns,
‚  qui _ qvi, all u ‰ v P rks and i P rns,
‚  qui _ qvj _ pij , all u ‰ v P rks and ti, ju P
`
n
2
˘
.
The set of clauses Colormn pp¯, r¯q uses atoms p¯ and n.m more atoms ria where
i P rns and a P rms, intended to describe an m-coloring of the graph. It
consists of the following clauses:
‚ ŽaPrms ria, all i P rns,
‚  ria _ rib, all a ‰ b P rms and i P rns,
‚  ria _ rja _ pij, all a P rms and ti, ju P
`
n
2
˘
.
Note that every occurrence of atoms pij in Clique
k
npp¯, q¯q is positive, or in
other words it is monotone in p¯.
The exponential lower bound for intuitionistic logic is demonstrated in the
following theorem due to P. Hrubesˇ. The main idea is that any short proof
for the hard tautology provides a small monotone circuit to decide whether
a given graph is a clique or colorable, which we know is a hard problem to
decide [1].
Theorem 4.5. [12] Let p¯ “ p1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , pn and q¯ “ q1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , qn and p¯, q¯, r¯, s¯ be
disjoint variables, v¯ “ tp¯, q¯, r¯, s¯u, and k “ t?nu. Then the formulas
ΘKn :“
ľ
i“1,¨¨¨ ,n
ppi _ qiq Ñ  Colorknpp¯, s¯q _  Cliquek`1n p q¯, r¯q
are intuitionistic tautologies. Moreover, every IPC´ F-proof of ΘKn contains
at least 2Ωpn
1{4q proof-lines.
We refer to the formulas ΘKn as Hrubesˇ’s formulas. The superscript K in
ΘKn stresses that the formulas contain negations. For our purposes, we need
to use a negation-free version of Hrubesˇ’s formulas.
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Definition 4.6. [13, Definition 6.28] For k ď n define:
αknpp¯, s¯, s¯1q :“
ł
iăn
ľ
lăk
s1i,l _
ł
i,jăn
ł
lăk
psi,l ^ sj,l ^ pi,jq,
βknpq¯, r¯, r¯1q :“
ł
lăk
ľ
iăn
r1i,l _
ł
i,jăn
ł
lămăk
pri,l ^ rj,m ^ qi,jq.
Define the negation-free Hrubesˇ formulas for k “ t?nu as follows:
Θn :“
ľ
i,j
ppi,j_qi,jq Ñ rp
ľ
i,l
psi,l_s1i,lq Ñ αknpp¯, s¯, s¯1qq_p
ľ
i,l
pri,l_r1i,lq Ñ βk`1n pq¯, r¯, r¯1qqs.
Notice that Colorknpp¯, s¯q “  αknpp¯, s¯, s¯q and Cliqueknpp¯, r¯q “  βknp p¯, r¯, r¯q.
The lower bound of Theorem 4.5 also applies to Θn [13].
To make Hrubesˇ’s formulas negation-free, Jerˇa´bek introduced new propo-
sitional variables s1i,l and r
1
i,l to play the role of  si,l and  ri,l, respectively.
This trick provides some implication-free formulas αkn and β
k
n in the defini-
tion 4.6 to make the formulas Θn more amenable to the technique that we
provided in Section 4.
Theorem 4.7. ([13, Theorem 6.37]) Let L be a super-intuitionistic logic with
infinite branching. Then the formulas Θn are intuitionistic tautologies and
they require L ´ EF-proofs of length 2nΩp1q, and L ´ F-proofs with at least
2n
Ωp1q
lines.
4.2 Weak hard tautologies
The following lemmas are easy observations. The first one states that fusion
distributes over disjunction in substructural logics. The second one presents
a property of the sequent calculus LK.
Lemma 4.8. In the sequent calculus WL we have the following:
WL $ n˚
i“1
pAi _Biq ô
ł
I
p n˚
i“1
DIi q
where I Ď t1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , nu and DIi “
"
Ai , i P I
Bi , i R I .
Proof. The proof is easy and uses induction on n. Note that in each disjunct
in the right hand-side, DIi is either Ai or Bi, according to the subset I.
However, the order of the subscripts must be increasing. For instance, for
the case n “ 2 we have
WL $ pA1_B1q ˚ pA2_B2q ô pA1 ˚B2q_ pA1 ˚A2q_ pB1 ˚A2q_ pB1 ˚B2q.
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Lemma 4.9. Suppose α1 Ñ α2 and β1 Ñ β2 have no propositional variables
in common. If the formula α1^α2 Ñ β1_ β2 is provable in LK, then either
α1 Ñ α2 or β1 Ñ β2 is provable in LK.
Proof. It is an easy corollary of Craig’s interpolation theorem.
We are now ready to formulate hard tautologies in WL and prove the
lower bound. By ˚n´1i“1 ˚
n´1
j“1 Ai,j , we mean that the indices first range over j
and then over i, which will result in the lexicographic order, i.e., it has the
following form
A1,1 ˚A1,2 ˚ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˚A1,n´1 ˚A2,1 ˚ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˚ An´1,n´1.
For a set (sequence of formulas) Γ, by ‖ Γ ‖ we mean the number of elements
of the set (the number of formulas the sequence contains).
Theorem 4.10.
Θ˚n :“ r
n´1
˚
i“1
n´1
˚
j“1
pppi,j ^ 1q _ pqi,j ^ 1qqs z
rn´1˚
i“1
k´1
˚
l“1
ppsi,l^1q_ps1i,l^1qqzαknpp¯, s¯, s¯1qs _ r
n´1
˚
i“1
k´1
˚
l“1
ppri,l^1q_pr1i,l^1qqzβk`1n pq¯, r¯, r¯1qs
are provable in WL, where 1 ď k ď n.
Proof. Let us denote the following formula by A:
rn´1˚
i“1
k´1
˚
l“1
ppsi,l^1q_ps1i,l^1qqzαknpp¯, s¯, s¯1qs _ r
n´1
˚
i“1
k´1
˚
l“1
ppri,l^1q_pr1i,l^1qqzβk`1n pq¯, r¯, r¯1qs.
First, we show
WL $ n´1˚
i“1
n´1
˚
j“1
QIi,j ñ A p:q
for any I Ď tpi, jq | i, j P t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , n´1uu, such thatQi,j “
"
pi,j ^ 1 , pi, jq P I
qi,j ^ 1 , pi, jq R I .
For simplicity from now on, unless specified otherwise, we will delete the
ranges of i, j and l, which are indicated in p:q.
It is easy to see how proving p:q will result in proving the theorem. The reason
is the following. Since p:q is provable for any I Ď tpi, jq | i, j P t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , n´1uu,
using the left disjunction rule for 2pn´1q
2 ´ 1 many times on p:q, we get
WL $
ł
I
˚
i
˚
j
QIi,j ñ A.
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Furthermore, Lemma 4.8 allows us to obtain
WL $ ˚
i
˚
j
pppi,j ^ 1q _ pqi,j ^ 1qq ñ
ł
I
˚
i
˚
j
QIi,j ,
and using the cut rule and the rule pRzq, we conclude
WL $ñ Θ˚n.
On the other hand, Θn is provable in LJ, and therefore also provable in LK.
Using the distributivity of conjunction over disjunction we have
LK $
ľ
pi,jqPM
pi,j^
ľ
pi,jqPN
qi,j ñ r
ľ
i,l
psi,l_s1i,lq Ñ αknpp¯, s¯, s¯1qs_r
ľ
i,l
pri,l_r1i,lq Ñ βk`1n pq¯, r¯, r¯1qs
for any M and N such that M YN “ tpi, jq | i, j P t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , n´ 1uu. For such
M and N , using Lemma 4.9 we have either
LK $
ľ
pi,jqPM
pi,j ñ p
ľ
i,l
psi,l _ s1i,lq Ñ αknpp¯, s¯, s¯1qq,
or
LK $
ľ
pi,jqPN
qi,j ñ p
ľ
i,l
pri,l _ r1i,lq Ñ βk`1n pq¯, r¯, r¯1qq.
We consider the first case, the second one being similar. Therefore, suppose
the first case holds. Using the cut rule, we have
LK $
ľ
pi,jqPM
pi,j ,
ľ
i,l
psi,l _ s1i,lq ñ αknpp¯, s¯, s¯1q,
and using the left exchange rule we obtain
LK $
ľ
i,l
psi,l _ s1i,lq ,
ľ
pi,jqPM
pi,j ñ αknpp¯, s¯, s¯1q.
Now, using the distributivity of conjunction over disjunction in LK we have
for any U and V such that U Y V “ tpi, lq | i ă n, l ă ku
LK $ p
ľ
pi,lqPU
si,l ^
ľ
pi,lqPV
s1i,lq ,
ľ
pi,jqPM
pi,j ñ αknpp¯, s¯, s¯1q,
or equivalently (using the rules pL^1q, pL^2q, and left contraction),
LK $
ľ
pi,lqPU
si,l ^
ľ
pi,lqPV
s1i,l ^
ľ
pi,jqPM
pi,j ñ αknpp¯, s¯, s¯1q.
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Now, using Theorem 4.3
LK $ pn´1˚
i“1
k´1
˚
l“1
S
U,V
i,l q ˚ p ˚
pi,jqPM
ppi,j ^ 1qq ñ αknpp¯, s¯, s¯1q,
where SU,Vi,l “
"
si,l ^ 1 , pi, jq P U
s1i,l ^ 1 , pi, jq P V .
Note that by Theorem 4.3, we can choose any order on ˚pi,jqPMppi,j^ 1q pro-
vided we do not change it throughout the proof. Since the order is arbitrary,
for simplicity we do not explicitly write it down.
Equivalently (using the fact that for any formulas A and B, we have WL $
A,B ñ A ˚ B and then using the cut rule), we have
WL $ pn´1˚
i“1
k´1
˚
l“1
S
U,V
i,l q , p ˚
pi,jqPM
ppi,j ^ 1qq ñ αknpp¯, s¯, s¯1q.
Since this sequent is provable for any U and V such that U Y V “ tpi, lq |
i ă n, l ă ku, using the left disjunction rule for 2pn´1qpk´1q ´ 1 many times
we get
WL $
ł
U,V
pn´1˚
i“1
k´1
˚
l“1
S
U,V
i,l q , p˚
M
ppi,j ^ 1qq ñ αknpp¯, s¯, s¯1q.
Using Theorem 4.8 and the cut rule we have
WL $ r˚
i
˚
l
ppsi,l ^ 1q _ ps1i,l ^ 1qqs , p˚
M
ppi,j ^ 1qq ñ αknpp¯, s¯, s¯1q,
and using the rule pRzq we get
WL $ ˚
M
ppi,j ^ 1q ñ r˚
i
˚
l
ppsi,l ^ 1q _ ps1i,l ^ 1qqs z αknpp¯, s¯, s¯1q.
Now, using the rules pL1q and pL^2q consecutively for ‖ N ‖-many times
(each time we produce qi,j ^ 1 for each element of N , in the same manner as
in the proof of Theorem 4.3) and then using the rule pL˚q for ‖ N ‖-many
times and in the end using the rule pR_1q we prove p:q.
Note that the formulas Θ˚n depend on the variable k, as well. The reason
for our notation is that we are only concerned with the case where k “ t?nu
and we will prove the lower bound for this case.
Remark 4.11. It is worth noting that the system WL could have been
defined in an alternative way by deleting { instead of z from the language,
and having the same initial sequents and rules as FL and leaving the rules
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pR{q, pL{q, and pLzq out. Then, in a similar manner, the following formulas
would be provable in this alternative calculus:
rαknpp¯, s¯, s¯1q{
n´1
˚
i“1
k´1
˚
l“1
ppsi,l^1q_ps1i,l^1qqs _ rβk`1n pq¯, r¯, r¯1q{
n´1
˚
i“1
k´1
˚
l“1
ppri,l^1q_pr1i,l^1qqs {
rn´1˚
i“1
n´1
˚
j“1
pppi,j ^ 1q _ pqi,j ^ 1qs.
Now, we are ready to present tautologies in FL and BPC. It is easy to
see that the tautologies introduced in Theorem 4.10 are provable in basic
substructural logics.
Corollary 4.12. The formulas Θ˚n are provable in the logic FL.
Proof. Clearly,WL is a subsystem of the sequent calculus FLK. Then, using
the cut elimination theorem [8, Theorem 7.8] for FLK, and the fact that Θ
˚
n
do not contain K, we obtain the result.
To provide tautologies in BPC, we need the translation function, t, defined
in Section 3.
Corollary 4.13. The formulas pΘ˚nqt are provable in BPC.
Proof. The provability of pΘ˚nqt is a consequence of Theorem 4.3 and Lemma
3.4.
5 The main theorem
In this section we will present the main result of the paper. We will prove
that there exists an exponential lower bound on the lengths of proofs in
proof systems for a wide range of logics. Furthermore, we will obtain an
exponential lower bound on the number of proof-lines in a broad range of
Frege systems.
Theorem 5.1. Let L be a super-intitionistic logic with infinite branching.
piq Let P be a proof system for a logic with the language L˚ such that
FL ď P ďtp L ´ EF. Then there is an exponential lower bound on the
lengths of proofs in P.
piiq Let P be a proof system for a logic with the language L such that
BPC ď P ďp L ´ EF. Then there is an exponential lower bound
on the lengths of proofs in P.
26
Proof. piq Since FL $ Θ˚n by 4.10, and FL ď P, the formulas Θ˚n are also
provable in P. Take such a proof pi, i.e., P $pi Θ˚n. Since P ďtp L ´ EF,
there exists a proof pi1 and a polynomial p, such that L´EF $pi1 pΘ˚nqt and
|pi1| “ pp|pi|q. We want to prove L ´ EF $ pΘ˚nqt Ñ Θn by a proof whose
length is polynomial in n. First, since L is a super-intuitionistic logic, we have
L´EF $ u^J Ø u, where u is any of the atoms present in the formulas Θn.
This proof has a fix number of proof-lines in L´ EF. The claim then easily
follows from the fact that the length of the formula Θn is also polynomial
in n. Therefore, Θn is provable in L ´ EF with a proof polynomially long
in n and pi1. By 4.7, any L ´ EF-proof of Θn has length at least 2Ωpn1{4q.
Therefore, the length of pi must be exponential in n.
piiq The proof for this part is similar to that of piq. Here, the formulas pΘ˚nqt
are provable in BPC and hence in P. Since L´ EF polynomially simulates
P, we obtain the exponential lower bound using the fact that L ´ EF $
pΘ˚nqt Ñ Θn.
The following theorem states an exponential lower bound on the number
of proof-lines in a wide range of Frege systems.
Theorem 5.2. Let M be a super-intitionistic logic with infinite branching.
piq Let L be a logic with the language L˚ such that FL Ď L Ďt M. Then,
there exists an exponential lower bound on the number of proof-lines in
L´ F and on the lengths of proofs in L´ EF.
piiq Let L be a logic with the language L such that BPC Ď L Ď M. Then,
there exists an exponential lower bound on the number of proof-lines in
L´ F and on the lengths of proofs in L´ EF.
Proof. To prove piq, note that since FL $ Θ˚n by 4.12, and FL Ď L, we have
L $ Θ˚n. Let pi be a proof of Θ˚n in L ´ EF. Using the assumption we will
provide a proof pi1 of pΘ˚nqt in M ´ EF such that λppi1q ď cλppiq. Fix an
extended Frege system Q for the logic M. Define the system P as the system
consisting of all the rules in Q plus the rules:
At
1
. . . Atl
At
for any rule of L´ EF of the form:
A1 . . . Al
A
We have to show that P is an extended Frege system for the logic M. To be
more precise, we have to show that P is strongly sound and strongly complete
with respect to M, because the other conditions (1 and 2 in Definition 3.8)
27
are obvious. P is strongly complete wrt M, since it contains Q and Q is
strongly complete wrt M. For strongly soundness, note that for any rule in
L´ EF of the form:
A1 . . . Al
A
since all the rules in L ´ EF are standard, we have A1, . . . Al $L A. By
Remark 3.5, At
1
, . . . Atl $M At. Hence, all the new rules in P are standard
with respect to M.
To bound the number of proof-lines, let pi “ φ1, . . . , φm be a proof for Θ˚n in
L ´ EF. Then, each φi is either an extension axiom, or it is derived from
tφj1 , . . . , φjlu such that all jr’s are less than i. It is clear that pi1 “ pit “
φt
1
, . . . , φtm is a proof in P, since the translation t of the extension axiom of
L´ EF will be the extension axiom of M´ EF and moreover,
φtj1 . . . φ
t
jl
φti
is an instance of a rule in P. Note that the number of proof-lines stay the
same, i.e., λppiq “ λppi1q.
Therefore, the formula pΘ˚nqt has a proof in P whose number of lines is the
same as the number of lines of the proof of Θ˚n in L ´ EF. Since for any
formula φ in the language L˚ we have |φ| “ |φt|, therefore the length of pi
is the same as the length of pi1. On the other hand, as we observed in the
proof of Theorem 5.1, we can show that pΘ˚nqt Ñ Θn has a proof in P with
polynomial number of lines. Gluing these proofs together, we will obtain
a proof for Θn in P. Since any proof for Θn in P has exponential length
(Theorem 4.7), any proof for Θ˚n in L´EF will also have exponential length.
Note that the above construction also works for the case of considering Frege
systems. It is easy to see that the translation of every proof in L´F will be
a proof in M ´ F, and the number of proof-lines stay the same. Therefore,
the bound on the number of proof-lines follows.
For part piiq, using Corollary 4.13, pΘ˚nqt is provable in BPC and hence in
L. Fix an extended Frege system Q for the logic M. Add the rules of L´EF
to Q. The resulting system, which we denote by P, is an extended Frege
system for the logic M. The reason is similar to the argument in the part
piq, using the facts that L Ď M and all the rules of L´EF are standard with
respect to L. Let pi be a proof for pΘ˚nqt in L´EF, therefore, it will also be a
proof in P with the same number of lines and same length. Again by gluing
the short proof of P $ pΘ˚nqt Ñ Θn to pi, we reach the result as in the proof
for part piq.
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Corollary 5.3. Let S be any subset of te, c, i, ou, and L be FLS, BPC, EBPC,
or any of the logics of the sequent calculi in Table 1. Then there is an
exponential lower bound on the number of proof-lines in L ´ F and on the
lengths of proofs in L´ EF.
6 The lower bound for sequent calculi
So far, we have provided a lower bound for proof systems for logics as least
as strong as FL and polynomially simulated by an extended Frege system
for an infinite branching super-intuitionistic logic. It is very desirable to
see if the lower bound also applies to proof systems for logics outside this
range, for instance their classical counterparts. The result in this section is an
attempt in this direction and we reach a positive answer for any proof system
polynomially weaker than CFL´ew, which is the system CFLew without the
cut rule. For that matter, we first transfer the lower bound from the previous
section to the sequent-style proof system FLS for any S Ď te, c, i, ou. Then
we use the observation that any cut-free proof of a single-conclusion sequent
in the 0-free fragment of CFLew is also an FLew-proof.
Theorem 6.1. Let Γ be a sequence of formulas γ1, . . . , γm, A a formula and
S any subset of te, c, i, ou. If FLS $pi Γñ A then there exists a Frege system
P for FLS such that
P $pi1 m˚
i“1
γizA
such that λppi1q “ λppiq.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.2. As noted in the
discussion after Definition 2.3, since FLS $ Γ ñ A, we have Γ $FLS A.
Therefore, for any Frege system Q for the logic FLS, by strong completeness
in Definition 3.8, we have Γ $Q A. Fix such Q. The method is developing
a Frege system P for FLS by transforming all the axioms and rules of the
sequent calculus FLS to Frege rules in the new system. For the sake of
completeness, we also add Q to the resulting system.
Recall that for Γ “ H, the formula ˚Γ is defined as 1 and for any single-
conclusion sequent T “ pΓ ñ ∆q by IpT q, the interpretation of the sequent
T , we meant ˚Γz∆, if ∆ is non-empty, and ˚Γz0 for ∆ “ H. Now, define
P as the system consisting of the rules of Q plus the following rules: for the
axiom T in the sequent calculus FLS add
IpT q
and for any rule in the sequent calculus FLS of the form
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T1 . . . Tm
T
add the following rule
IpT1q . . . IpTmq
IpT q
where m “ 1 or m “ 2. We have to show that P is a Frege system for the
logic FLS, i.e., P is strongly sound and strongly complete wrt the logic FLS.
First, since Q is strongly complete wrt FLS, then so is P. Now for strongly
soundness, we have to show that the new rules are standard wrt FLS. I.e.,
for any rule of the form
IpT1q . . . IpTmq
IpT q
in P we have to show IpT1q, . . . , IpTmq $FLS IpT q. However, it is not hard
to show that, since in the sequent calculus FLS the cut rule exists, we have
ñ IpTiq $FLS Ti using
ñ ˚Γzφ $FLS Γñ φ.
Using the corresponding rule, T1, . . . , Tm $FLS T , the fact that T $FLSñ
IpT q, and the cut rule we have ñ IpT1q, . . . ,ñ IpTmq $FLSñ IpT q. There-
fore, by definition, IpT1q, . . . , IpTmq $FLS IpT q. Therefore, P is a Frege
system for FLS.
For the number of proof-lines, note that if pi “ T1, . . . , Tn is a proof for
Tn “ pΓ ñ Aq in FLS, then it is easy to see that IpT1q, . . . , IpTnq will be a
proof for ˚mi“1 γizA in P. Therefore, λppi1q “ λppiq.
Corollary 6.2. For any S Ď te, i, o, cu we have FLS $ñ Θ˚n and the number
of lines of any proof of this sequent is exponential in n.
By a 0-free formula in CFLew, we mean a formula only consisting of propo-
sitional variables, the constant 1, and the connectives t^,_,Ñ, ˚u.
Lemma 6.3. If Γ is a sequence of 0-free formulas, then CFL´ew & Γñ.
Proof. Suppose pΓñq has a proof in CFL´ew. Since the proof is cut-free and
Γ is 0-free, by the subformula property of CFL´ew, the whole proof is also
0-free. Therefore, there is no axiom in the proof with an empty succedent,
because such an axiom must be in the form p0 ñq, which is not 0-free.
Moreover, if the succedent of the conclusion of any rule is empty, then the
succedent of at least one of its premises must be empty, as well. The reason
is the following. First, note that the last rule is not an axiom, as stated. It
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cannot be a right rule either, because they always have at least one formula in
the succedent of their conclusion. And for the left rules, the claim is evident
by a simple case checking. The only non-trivial case to check is pLÑq which
also has such a premise:
Υñ φ Π, ψ,Σñ
(LÑ)
Π, φÑ ψ,Υ,Σñ
Therefore, any sequent in the proof with an empty succedent has also a
premise with an empty succedent. This is clearly a contradiction.
The following theorem, which is of independent interest, states that for
positive formulas, a cut-free proof for a single-conclusion sequent in CFLew
is also a proof for the same sequent in FLew.
Theorem 6.4. Suppose Γ is a sequence of 0-free formulas and A is a 0-free
formula. Then any proof pi for Γñ A in CFL´ew is also a proof in FLew.
Proof. The sketch of the proof is the following: suppose pi is a cut-free proof
in CFLew such that all the formulas in the proof are 0-free. Then, along
the proof, the number of formulas in the succedent of the sequents does
not decrease. The reason lies in the fact that neither the cut rule nor the
contraction rules are present. Hence, in the special case that the sequent is
also single-conclusion, the succedents of all the sequents in the whole proof
will contain exactly one formula. Therefore, the proof is in FLew.
Let pi be a proof for Γ ñ A in CFL´ew. By induction on the structure of pi
we will show it is also a proof for the same sequent in FLew. As stated in
the proof of Lemma 6.3, every formula in the proof must be 0-free.
If Γ ñ A is an instance of an axiom in CFL´ew, then it is either ñ 1 or
an instance of the axiom φ ñ φ, which are both also axioms in the sequent
calculus FLe. For the induction step, note that the last rule in the proof
cannot be p0wq. For all the other rules (except for the rule pLÑq), it is easy
to see that since the conclusion of the rule is single-conclusion, then every
premise must also be single-conclusion. It remains to investigate the case
where the last rule used in the proof is pLÑq:
pi1
Υñ φ,Λ
pi2
Π, ψ,Σñ ∆ pLÑq
Π, φÑ ψ,Υ,Σñ ∆,Λ
There are two possibilities; either Λ is empty and ∆ is equal to A
pi1
Υñ φ
pi2
Π, ψ,Σñ A pLÑq
Π, φÑ ψ,Υ,Σñ A
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or ∆ is empty and Λ is equal to A
pi1
Υñ φ,A
pi2
Π, ψ,Σñ pLÑq
Π, φÑ ψ,Υ,Σñ A
In the former since both premises are single-conclusion, by induction hypoth-
esis, pi1 and pi2 are proofs in FLew and by applying the rule pLÑq we obtain
a proof for Γ ñ A. On the other hand, the latter cannot happen since the
right premise is of the form Π, ψ,Σ ñ and the antecedent of this sequent is
0-free. Therefore, Lemma 6.3 implies that it is not provable in CFL´ew.
Theorem 6.5. The formulas
Θ˜k˚n :“ r˚
i,j
pppi,j ^ 1q _ pqi,j ^ 1qqs Ñ
r˚
i,l
ppsi,l^1q_ps1i,l^1qq Ñ αknpp¯, s¯, s¯1qs _ r˚
i,l
ppri,l^1q_pr1i,l^1qq Ñ βk`1n pq¯, r¯, r¯1qs.
are provable in CFL´e . Moreover, every CFL
´
e -proof of Θ˜
˚
n contains at least
2Ωpn
1{4q proof-lines and hence has length exponential in terms of the length of
Θ˜˚n.
Proof. Since formulas Θ˚n are provable in FL 4.10 and therefore in FLew,
they are provable in CFLew. However, since in FLew and CFLew the ex-
change rules are present, as stated in the preliminaries the connectives z and
{ are substituted by Ñ. Therefore, the tautologies Θ˚n will have the more
recognizable form Θ˜˚n. Using the cut elimination theorem for CFLew, formu-
las Θ˜˚n are also provable in CFL
´
ew. By Theorem 6.4, since Θ˜
˚
n are 0-free any
cut-free proof for these formulas in CFL´ew is also a proof in FLew. However,
Theorem 6.1 guaranties these proofs contain at least 2Ωpn
1{4q proof-lines and
hence the lengths of these proofs are exponential in terms of the length of
Θ˜˚n.
Remark 6.6. So far, we do not have any method to extend the lower bound
to the calculus CFLe, where the cut rule is present. Note that since there
are no non-trivial lower bounds for the sequent calculus LK, we can not use
a similar argument as that in the proof of Theorem 4.10.
Corollary 6.7. For any proof system P such that CFL´e ď P ďp CFL´ew,
there is an exponential lower bound on the length of proofs in P. As a result,
there are exponential lower bounds on the length of proofs in sequent calculi
CFL´e , CFL
´
ei, and CFL
´
eo.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 6.5.
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